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Abstract 
This paper studies the influence of politically connected Board of Directors on Brazilian 
firms’ future performance. We control for the drivers of firm performance on the Brazilian 
market, the influence of a political related Board of Director’s member on future firm 
performance and the differences of this influence between outperforming and underperforming 
companies. Using a sample of 49 ibovespa companies’ Board of Directors from 2010 to 2015 
we conclude that politically connected members of the Board have a positive influence on the 
one-year-ahead firm performance. We also conclude that this influence is stronger in companies 
that underperform the industry. 
 
Keywords: Political Connections; Firm Performance; Board of Directors; Corporate 
Governance  
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1. - Introduction 
The impact of political connections on the firm performance and the market value is 
present on a large body of literature. According to the resource dependence theory developed 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), political connections can help firms to obtain key resources, 
cope with various external uncertainties, and thereby increase firm value. Consistent with this, 
Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar (2012) find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness 
after the establishment of a political connection. The authors also find that the political 
connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for 
firms with closer ties to political power. 
The positive relationship between board’s political connections and the firm 
performance can be explained by several reasons. According to Lashitew (2014), the strength 
of political connections, measured by the amount of time the firm’s senior managers spend with 
government officials, has a significant positive effect on credit access. The effect of political 
connections is higher in countries where the banking sector is more concentrated and has higher 
net interest margin. In addition, according to the work of Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar (2012), 
politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance 
from their ties with politicians. Moreover, Lu (2011) finds that Political Connections lead to 
increase of trade expansion. Political connections affect trade expansion by overcoming 
insecure property rights institutions and inefficient contracting institutions. Plus, Kim and 
Zhang (2016) find that Politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected 
firms because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax 
law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk-
taking tendencies induced by political connections. Another reason may be related with 
corporate bailouts, since according to Faccio, Masulis and McConnel (2006) politically 
connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected firms 
are. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed 
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out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to 
the firm’s home government. Further, among bailed-out firms, those that are politically 
connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers do 
at the time of and following bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, 
political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial 
assistance when connected companies confront economic distress. Finally, Houston, Jiang, Lin 
and Ma (2014) find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have 
board members with political ties. The authors consider two possible explanations for these 
findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that 
connections enhance the borrower’s credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks 
assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. 
Political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity 
requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Political connections increase 
the value of the U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, 
which, in turn, reduces the borrowers’ cost of debt.  
The geographic location of the firms also represents an important factor in this 
relationship. Consistent with this, Du and Girma (2010) find that there is robust evidence that 
political affiliation enhances firm’s survival and growth prospects. However, interestingly 
politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster productivity improvements conditional on survival. In 
addition, the benefits of political connections are largely confined to firms associated with local 
or top level governments, and they are more pronounced in capital-intensive industries. We 
conclude that the close association between the state and a segment of the business community 
is leading to sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy by interfering with the process of 
market selection.  
The geographic importance of the relationship opens a gap in the literature, as the 
relationship has mostly been studied for Asian countries, with, of course, some exceptions. 
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Niessen and Ruenzi (2009) find that in Germany Politically connected firms are larger, less 
risky and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth 
opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms 
significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006.  
In this work, we try to fill this gap by studying the influence of politically connected 
boards on the future performance of Brazilian companies. We took Brazil has the ideal setting 
to perform this study for the following reasons: First, political connections are a common 
situation in the board of important companies. This is due to the fact that several own-state 
companies are among the top performers of the country and for that reason may be selected as 
a good setting for the country market index. Second, and according to Gokhberg, Kuznetsova 
and Zaytseva (2012), Brazil is among the biggest, fastest growing emerging markets, giving the 
perfect setting for companies to have a consolidated increase in their performance through the 
years. 
With our study, we were able to understand how the Brazilian companies’ performance 
is influenced by a political connected Board of Directors. Most of the results were consistent 
with our expectations. Brazilian companies’ future performance is positively influenced by a 
political connected Board of Directors (BoD). Moreover, the companies that outperform the 
market industry have their future performance less influenced by a political connected BoD. 
The opposite effect may be verified in the companies that underperform the market industry. 
 
2. - Related Research and Hypothesis Development 
According to Nee (1992) and McMillan (1997) in transition economies, the government 
control a wide range of financial and regulatory resources either through its power of planning 
or through its full control over the state-owned enterprises. It is usual that companies in these 
economies use political resources to avoid so called government extorsion such as arbitrary fees 
and charges and to beneficiate from it. The benefits to the companies include, according to You 
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and Du (2012), Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra and Saffar (2010), Claessens (2008) Faccio 
(2010) Francis, Hasan and Sun (2009), Mobarak and Pur-basari (2006),  Chen, Firth, Gao and 
Rui (2006) access to loans from state owned banks, more favorable tax treatment, more flexible 
budget constraints, more relaxed market entry regulation, greater change of government bailout 
in case of default and so on. As a consequence of the benefits it is expected that the motivation 
of having political connected boards to increase. 
The work done by  You and Du (2012) was the main reference for the realization of our 
study. The authors used a large sample of listed firms in China and find that politically 
connected CEOs are less likely to be fired and that sensitivity of forced turnover to firm 
performance is weaker for connected CEOs than for their non-connected peers. There is a 
suggestion that CEOs in transition economies tend to use their political resources for their own 
good. The work “Are Political Connections a Blessing or a Curse? Evidence from CEO turnover 
in China” also finds significant positive relationship between political connections and future 
firm performance only when firm profitability is below the industry median.  
In transition economies, the uncertainty in the policy making and the weak institutional 
characteristics bring substantial transaction costs for the firms, according to the study of  
Williamson (1991). You and Du (2012), find that they create and strengthen the incentives to 
develop informal institutions including government-business relationships to comply with the 
current rules and enhance the efficiency of formal institutions. Consequently, business 
organizations tend to engage in political behaviors to internalize these costs and influence the 
policy process in ways favorable to them. This implies the additional value of political ties for 
firms in transaction countries. Consistent with this view, Faccio (2006) finds that benefits 
obtained from political connections are especially noticeable in countries with high levels of 
corruption and weak legal system. According to Lorenzon (2017) Brazil’s judiciary still has 
palpable problems, particularly its excessive cost and a bloated workload. In addition, judges 
enjoy certain prerogatives that are frequently abused. In addition, Brazil takes part in one of the 
 8 
biggest corruption scandals in history. In the last three years, hundreds of businesspeople and 
politicians have been investigated and prosecuted for taking part in a massive bribery scheme 
involving state-owned companies. In line with what was said before that we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. In the Brazilian market, future firm performance is positively related to 
political connections of the members of the Board of Directors of the companies. 
Finally we examine whether the influence of political connections on future firm 
performance varies with a firm’s operational performance. In order to do that, we divided the 
sample of firms in two categories: Firms that have 2015 ROA above the same year industry 
median, and firms that have ROA below the industry median. In other words, we divided the 
sample into, respectively, companies that outperform the industry and companies that 
underperform the industry. You and Du (2012) state that it is expected for an underperforming 
company’s Board to face greater pressure from shareholders. Therefore greater efforts will be 
done in order to improve firm performance. This might mean that benefits from political 
connections will be used more often when a firm is underperforming. At the same time, and 
consistent with this, Jiaxing You and Guqian Du (2012) state that the government tends to help 
underperforming connected firms through the provision of fiscal subsidies and/or low cost 
loans. Moreover, and as it was said before, when confronting economic distress, politically 
connected firms are more likely to be bailed out than their non-connected peers (Faccio, Masulis 
and McConnell, 2006). We test this prediction in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between future firm performance and political 
connections is stronger when current return on assets is below the industry median rather than 
above it. 
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3. - Research Design 
3.1. - Research Context  
As a transitional economy, Brazil provides an ideal setting for our study. Ramalho 
(2007) shows that politically connected firms in Brazil lost value during the impeachment of 
then-president Collor in 1992, which means that there is a strong influence of the government 
on the economy. In addition, a significant percentage of the listed firms in Brazil are either 
state-owned or have strong political connections.  
The six-year period considered for this study coincides with the end of a decade in 
which, according to Weisbrot, Johnston and Lefebvre (2014) the Brazilian economy has gone 
through a significant transformation. It was a period when poverty and extreme poverty 
decreased significantly and the main contributor was an increasing economic growth with the 
government as the propellant.   
Despite the control over economy may be done in the wrong way, that does not make 
Brazil a worst setting for our study since, according to Faccio (2006) the benefits obtained from 
political connections are especially noticeable in countries with high levels of corruption and 
weak legal system. 
 
3.2. - Sample Construction and Data Sources 
The sample used to performed our study contains all the companies that make up the 
market index (ibovespa) of the Brazilian Stock Market over the period 2010-2015. Data related 
with the members of the Board of Directors of each company through the years was collected 
from ‘Formulario de Referencia’ obtained on ‘Comissão de Valores Mobiliários’ website as 
part of the public reports. On the other hand, data related to the financial information was 
collected through the Bloomberg terminal. 
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Ibovespa is composed by 64 companies. Our sample is made by only 49 of those due to 
some missing public information about financial information of companies and the fact that 
some companies were listed in the stock market after or during the study period. 
In this study, we assumed Board of Directors as all the members, executive and non-
executive, plus the members of the Supervisory Board. The members of the Board of Directors 
were analyzed in order to understand the real involvement with the company and divided into 
executive/non-executive, independent/non-independent, members of the Supervisory Board or 
not, and political connected or not. When the companies had an audit committee composed by 
some of the directors instead of a Supervisory Board, none of the directors was included as a 
member of the Supervisory Board because it was of the interest of the study to analyze the 
members of the Supervisory Board as an independent board.  
Using this sample, information was collected in order to understand the board size and 
the number of: executive members, independent members, Supervisory Board members, 
politically connected members, executive members that are political connected, independent 
members that are political connected and Supervisory Board members that are political 
connected. 
 Related with the financials we collected information about total assets, total liabilities, 
enterprise value, EBITDA, short-term debt, long-term debt, total debt to EBITDA, revenues 
and Return on Assets. The resulting sample comprises 294 firm-year observations of 49 
companies over a six-year period.   
 
3.3. - Definition of Political Connections 
According to Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009) it is necessary to identify and define a 
proper measurement of political connections first when analyzing the impact of such 
connections. There are different approaches to this definition in the literature. Faccio (2006) 
considers parliament members, ministers, state principals, and anyone closely related to senior 
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officials as the source of political connections. Measurements from economies in transition may 
be different such as the definition of Shin, Hyun, Oh and Yang (2017) that states that 
independent directors are classified politically connected if they hold or have held a position as 
a judge, prosecutor, government official, member of congress, journalist, or social activist. The 
authors define political connections as having the ability to access key constituents surrounding 
a firm. There is also the partly affiliation (Republicans vs Democrats) as a key measurement 
factor as stated by Goldman et al (2009).  
Thus, and considering the reality in Brazil, we define as political connection any 
position on a government branch, any relation with a political party and any social position that 
may have influence on the government decisions.   
 
3.4. - Regression Model 
 To test the effect of politically connected members of Brazilian companies’ BoD on the 
future firm performance, we estimate the following regression model: 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒*+, = 𝑓(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠*, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙	𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠*) 
  
Future firm performance is measured by the one-year-ahead return on assets (ROA). 
Firm performance may be measured in several ways. Accounting rates of return, specifically 
return on assets, are still one of the most used performing measures, according to RC Anderson 
and DM Reeb (2003). Moreover, in line with You and Du (2012), we take a one-year lag to 
better understand the influence of a Board of Directors in a full year. By following previous 
research, we include several controlling variables that may influence firm performance. We 
separate the controlling variables into corporate governance related and financial related.  
In the first group, we include the number of political connected members of the Board 
of Directors, the number of executive members that are politically connected and the number 
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of the supervisory board members that are politically connected. As for the second group, we 
include firm size, total liabilities, enterprise value, EBITDA value and total debt to EBITDA 
ratio. Table 1 provides the description and measurement of the aforementioned control 
variables. 
 
Variable Description 
FIRM SIZE 
 
the Logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
TOTAL_LIABILITIES Total amount of liabilities at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. 
ENTERPRISE_VALUE Enterprise value of the company measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
EBITDA Value o of the company EBITDA at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. 
TOTAL_DEBT_TO_EBITDA Total debt measured as part of the total EBITDA value 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
PC_MEMBERS Number of Board of Director’s members that are 
politically connected at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
PC_AND_EXECUTIVE Number of Board of Director’s executive members that 
are politically connected at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. 
PC_AND_CF Number of Supervisory Board’s members that are 
politically connected at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Table 1 
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To test hypothesis 2, we separate the sample into two sub-samples: underperforming 
and outperforming companies. The division of the sample was based on the current firm return 
on assets, being underperforming all the companies that have current return on assets below the 
industry median and outperforming the companies with current return on assets above the 
industry median. We separately estimate the coefficients for the full, outperforming and 
underperforming samples to test our hypothesis.  
 
3.5. - Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the key variables in our regression model. 
In our sample, the average of ROA is 4,8167 and the average of political connected members 
of the Board of Directors is approximately 3. In addition, the average of the Board of Directors’ 
politically connected executive members is close to 0,5, meaning that most of the members 
with political ties assume a more independent position in the council. Finally, the average of 
the Supervisory Board’s politically connected members is approximately 0,8. Taking in 
consideration the size of the Supervisory Boards in Brazilian companies, we can conclude that 
there is a considerably large percentage of members with political relations.  
 
 
Table 2 
 
ROA_T_1 FIRM_SIZE
TOTAL
_LIABILITIES
ENTERPRISE
_VALUE EBITDA
TOTAL_DEBT
_TO_EBITDA PC_MEMBERS
PC_AND
_EXECUTIVE
PC_AND
_CF
Mean 4,816696 4,288268 24387,20 37162,91 3939,439 3,602275 3,057823 0,523810 0,833333
Median 4,516142 4,285757 9440,212 17350,01 1647,712 2,861972 1,000000 0,000000 0,000000
Maximum 40,92135 5,954308 642205,0 496303,5 61729,00 42,24248 18,00000 6,000000 7,000000
Minimum -13,50063 3,028863 218,6380 1564,686 -13215,33 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000
Std. Dev. 5,884119 0,504205 61532,52 73304,05 8919,832 4,508341 4,341253 1,193460 1,621984
Skewness 1,098756 0,601966 6,605824 4,156729 4,728774 5,877543 1,882904 2,513836 2,385752
Kurtosis 9,124916 3,946264 54,15265 20,74270 27,92446 45,47309 5,421409 8,895794 8,227217
Jarque-Bera 518,7097 28,72463 34191,48 4702,982 8705,757 23791,28 245,5456 735,4640 613,6152
Probability 0,000000 0,000001 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000
Sum 1416,109 1260,751 7169837 10925897 1158195 1059,069 899,0000 154,0000 245,0000
Sum Sq. Dev. 10144,50 74,48715 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 5955,264 5522,017 417,3333 770,8333
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
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Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients among the key variables used in our 
regression model. Focusing on our special interests, we can see that PC_MEMBERS variable 
is negatively correlated with the performance measure ROA_T_1, showing that politically 
connected members will increase in response to poor performance.  
 
 
Table 3 
 
4. - Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1. - The Effect of Political Connections on Future Firm Performance 
 The following Equations show the empirical results of the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions with one-year-ahead ROA as dependent variable. The PC_MEMBERS is 
the variable for the politically connected members of the Board of Directors. In the regressions, 
we include Political Connection variables and a series of control variables as explanatory 
variables.  
 Equation 1 shows that the coefficient on Political Connections is significantly positive 
(t = 3,4861 ; p = 0,0006). This result suggests that an increase in the number of politically 
connected members on the Board of Directors of Brazilian companies will significantly 
improve future firm performance, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
 The number of executive Board members with political connections is also important 
as an explanatory variable of the future firm performance (t = -2,1722; p < 0,05). However, the 
influence of the variable on firm performance is verified in the opposite direction. The same 
ROA_T_1 FIRM_SIZE
TOTAL
_LIABILITIES
ENTERPRISE
_VALUE EBITDA
TOTAL_DEBT
_TO_EBITDA PC_MEMBERS
PC_AND
_EXECUTIVE
PC_AND
_CF
ROA_T_1 1,000000 -0,309446 -0,221422 0,004834 -0,006603 -0,361876 -0,042934 -0,010661 -0,14017
FIRM _SIZE -0,309446 1,000000 0,655348 0,679847 0,597634 0,171121 0,33439 0,108126 0,457181
TOTAL _LIABILITIES -0,221422 0,655348 1,000000 0,832653 0,610846 0,367241 0,256982 0,082082 0,514363
ENTERPRISE_VALUE 0,004834 0,679847 0,832653 1,000000 0,844494 0,157744 0,182218 0,006042 0,408957
EBITDA -0,006603 0,597634 0,610846 0,844494 1,000000 -0,022966 0,187597 0,025353 0,206683
TOTAL_DEBT _TO_EBITDA -0,361876 0,171121 0,367241 0,157744 -0,022966 1,000000 0,056978 -0,035956 0,206683
PC_MEMBERS -0,042934 0,33439 0,256982 0,182218 0,187597 0,056978 1,000000 0,845876 0,818089
PC_AND _EXECUTIVE -0,010661 0,108126 0,082082 0,006042 0,025353 -0,035956 0,845876 1,000000 0,588289
PC_AND _CF -0,14017 0,457181 0,514363 0,408957 0,206683 0,206683 0,818089 0,588289 1,000000
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happens with the variable that controls for the number of Supervisory Board members with 
political connections (t = -1,9885; p <0,05).  
 These results may indicate a stronger influence of the independent members of the 
Board of Directors (latu sensu) on the Brazilian companies’ future firm performance. In other 
words, members that do not have a function other that of a non-executive counselor, have a 
positive influence on future firm performance when politically related. On the other hand, 
executive members and Supervisory Board members with political ties have a negative impact 
on the future firm performance of the companies.  
 
 
Equation 1 
 More than study the possible impact of the political connections of the BoD’s Members 
on the firm performance, we want to study the possible variation of this effect across different 
samples. More precisely, what is the difference in the impact on outperforming and 
underperforming companies. When the sample splits according to the median of ROA, the 
effects of politically connected members on firm performance change.  
Dependent Variable: ROA_T_1
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/03/18   Time: 18:06
Sample: 2010 2015
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 49
Total panel (balanced) observations: 294
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 30.81700 3.293727 9.356271 0.0000
FIRM_SIZE -6.256791 0.808704 -7.736810 0.0000
TOTAL_LIABILITIES -4.54E-05 9.81E-06 -4.623474 0.0000
ENTERPRISE_VALUE 8.81E-05 1.07E-05 8.212701 0.0000
EBITDA -0.000231 6.23E-05 -3.703760 0.0003
TOTAL_DEBT_TO_EBIT -0.353483 0.069968 -5.052100 0.0000
PC_MEMBERS 0.650610 0.186629 3.486113 0.0006
PC_AND_EXECUTIVE -1.035283 0.476596 -2.172243 0.0307
PC_AND_CF -0.723346 0.363791 -1.988354 0.0477
R-squared 0.386149     Mean dependent var 4.816696
Adjusted R-squared 0.368918     S.D. dependent var 5.884119
S.E. of regression 4.674384     Akaike info criterion 5.952206
Sum squared resid 6227.212     Schwarz criterion 6.064968
Log likelihood -865.9743     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.997364
F-statistic 22.41024     Durbin-Watson stat 0.658876
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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 Equation 2 shows the results referring to the sub-sample of the companies which the 
current year ROA is above the industry median, meaning the companies that outperform the 
industry. This regression shows that the coefficient on the performance impact of the politically 
connected non-executive Directors is less significant than it was for the complete sample of 
Brazilian companies (t = 2,1743; 0,05 > p > 0,0006). Once again, it is very important to analyze 
the behavior of the variables that control for the executive members of the BoD and the 
members of the Supervisory Board. The influence on firm performance of these samples is 
different for the sub-sample of the outperforming companies. PC_AND_EXECUTIVE have a 
more significant influence in this sub-sample (t = -2,2926; p < 0,0307) while PC_AND_CF 
loses importance on the behavior of the dependent variable (t = -1,3415; p > 0,1).  
 
Equation 3 shows the results referring to the sub-sample of the companies which current 
year ROA is below the industry median, meaning companies that underperform the industry. 
The regression shows that the coefficient on politically connected non-executive Directors is 
Dependent Variable: ROA_T_1
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/18/18   Time: 18:37
Sample: 2010 2015
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 22
Total panel (balanced) observations: 132
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 20.52711 8.696163 2.360479 0.0198
FIRM_SIZE -3.000102 2.367556 -1.267173 0.2075
TOTAL_LIABILITIES -0.000430 0.000199 -2.163990 0.0324
ENTERPRISE_VALUE -6.78E-06 4.19E-05 -0.161948 0.8716
EBITDA 0.001461 0.000643 2.271669 0.0248
TOTAL_DEBT_TO_EBIT -0.342199 0.131003 -2.612146 0.0101
PC_MEMBERS 0.698539 0.321273 2.174288 0.0316
PC_AND_EXECUTIVE -1.686318 0.735536 -2.292639 0.0236
PC_AND_CF -0.920701 0.686279 -1.341583 0.1822
R-squared 0.352275     Mean dependent var 7.230548
Adjusted R-squared 0.310146     S.D. dependent var 6.094722
S.E. of regression 5.062119     Akaike info criterion 6.147194
Sum squared resid 3151.881     Schwarz criterion 6.343748
Log likelihood -396.7148     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.227064
F-statistic 8.361920     Durbin-Watson stat 0.626622
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Equation 2 
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significantly positive (t = 1,9773; p < 0,0006), meaning that is even more significant than it was 
for the all sample.  
The sub-sample of the underperforming companies shows the opposite influence of the 
variables controlling for the executive members and the members of the supervisory board, 
when compared with the sub-sample of the outperforming companies. In the last regression, 
PC_AND_EXECUTIVE is no longer a statistically significant variable (t = -1,3417 ; p > 0,1) 
and PC_AND_CF is a more statistically significant variable than it was for the all sample (t = 
-3,2363; p < 0,0477). 
 
The previous results indicate that the relationship between politically connected 
members and future firm performance is mainly driven by the underperforming companies of 
the sample, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. This indicates that the number of politically 
connected members of a BoD is particularly important, and has particular effect on future firm 
Dependent Variable: ROA_T_1
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/18/18   Time: 18:41
Sample: 2010 2015
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 28
Total panel (balanced) observations: 168
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 24.19841 4.270721 5.666120 0.0000
FIRM_SIZE -5.082863 1.013471 -5.015300 0.0000
TOTAL_LIABILITIES -3.47E-05 1.40E-05 -2.484798 0.0140
ENTERPRISE_VALUE 7.45E-05 1.75E-05 4.256745 0.0000
EBITDA -0.000184 7.32E-05 -2.514408 0.0129
TOTAL_DEBT_TO_EBIT -0.276313 0.075261 -3.671409 0.0003
PC_MEMBERS 0.860380 0.221984 3.875858 0.0002
PC_AND_EXECUTIVE -0.851950 0.634971 -1.341715 0.1816
PC_AND_CF -1.355496 0.418834 -3.236360 0.0015
R-squared 0.353493     Mean dependent var 2.658565
Adjusted R-squared 0.320965     S.D. dependent var 4.982597
S.E. of regression 4.105839     Akaike info criterion 5.714780
Sum squared resid 2680.409     Schwarz criterion 5.882136
Log likelihood -471.0416     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.782701
F-statistic 10.86714     Durbin-Watson stat 0.948605
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Equation 3 
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performance when firms are in financial distress or simply underperforming vis a vis the 
industry. 
The results also showed an interesting relationship between the influence of the 
politically connected executive and non-executive members with the future firm performance. 
Politically connected executive directors have a stronger influence on the performance of 
Brazilian companies that outperform the industry and an insignificant influence on the 
companies that underperform the industry.  
These results may indicate a difference on the type of political relations that each 
company requires depending on the financial situation of the firm. There is also a separation of 
the way the different functions of the BoD use their political relationships, and the difference 
may be seen on the type of firm that might need each type of influence. 
An outperforming firm will probably have lower levels of growth and an increasing 
need of better and stable control, while an underperforming firm will have higher growth rates 
and needs for independent control and decisions that control the growth of the company, which 
is in accordance with the results of regressions 2 and 3.  
 
5. - Robustness Tests 
The literature suggests other firm performance measures than return on assets. One of 
the most used is Tobin’s q ratio which a financial market-based measure. According to 
Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj and Konsynski (1999), a forward-looking measure like Tobin’s q ratio 
is better able to capture the firm performance. 
To examine the robustness of our results to the return on assets as definition of firm 
performance, we use Tobin’s q as an alternative firm performance measure. Using Tobin’s q, 
we thus re-estimate the regressions in equations 1, 2 and 3 to evaluate the influence of political 
connections on the firm performance and the influence on the performance of the outperforming 
and underperforming companies. 
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The results show that the coefficient on Political Connections is significantly related 
with the future performance of the companies, which means that the robustness test is in 
accordance with the first hypothesis that is tested in our study. 
Moreover, the equations used to study the differences between outperforming and 
underperforming companies show a significant relationship between the future firm 
performance and the political connections of non-executive directors of underperforming 
companies and a less significant relationship for the outperforming companies. The robustness 
test is also in accordance with the second hypothesis tested in our study.  
As a conclusion, a change in the performance measure still guarantees the same results 
for our study. Since the robustness test results are qualitatively similar to those of the main 
specifications we can argue that que the equations used in our study produce robust and 
significant results.  
 
6. - Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The access to data for corporate governance matter is still an issue. There is no database 
available to collect this sort of information, which makes the search for data a slow and 
rudimentary process. Since all the corporate governance variables were manually created, using 
a larger sample to pursue more significant results would make the process even slower and 
risky, because collecting data by hand exposes the final product to human mistakes, that it 
wouldn’t be exposed if a reliable data base exited.  
The first limitation is connected to the second since, the difficulties felt on the data 
collection were reflected on the sample size. A study of a determined variable on an industry 
dimension would probably require a larger sample. A sample that was really representative of 
the Brazilian market. Using a larger sample would probably reveal better the importance of the 
politically connected members on the future performance of the firms but more importantly the 
difference between the outperforming and the underperforming companies. 
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The third limitation relies with financial information that is provided by the Brazilian 
companies. Approximately fifteen companies were withdraw from the sample due to missing 
financial information. Once again, this limitation is connected with the previous, since it is 
another issue connected with data collection. 
Finally, a stronger set of robustness tests would make us able to take more significant 
conclusion from the results. To test for other definitions of political connections would be a 
good way to test the robustness of the definition that we used in our study. In addition, to test 
for other firm performance measures would also turn the variable that we use as definition of 
firm performance a more robust variable. 
For further research, it would be interesting to perform a deeper study about the 
influence of political connections on the future firm performance in Brazil. To be able to 
perform the regressions with a larger sample might allow the introduction of new control 
variables and allow for a better understanding of the influence. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to focus the study on the different influences that the different functions inside the 
Board of Directors may have on the companies depending on their financial situation.  
Another interesting suggestion would be to perform a comparison between the influence 
of political related board members in a developed economy and the Brazilian economy. Would 
also be interesting to compare the influence between the Brazilian companies and the 
companies of a country with lower government influence on the market.  
Finally, to extend the study to other influences of political connections would be 
important for the literature. To study, for instance, the influence of political connections of the 
members on their turnover and understand how does the career path of a politically related 
member is driven would be an interesting work to perform. However, a project like this might 
require a larger team and a different set of tools to collect this type of information. 
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7. - Conclusion 
 Although the effects of political connections are part of the literature, the studies of the 
influence of it on the firm performance do not abound for the Brazilian market. Moreover, the 
importance of corporate governance on the Brazilian firm is still very small part of the literature. 
We explore this gap in the literature with this work. The influence that the political connected 
members of the Brazilian companies’ Board of Directors have on the future performance of 
those companies, reflecting the quality of corporate governance.  
 We argue that Brazilian firms with politically connected members of the Board of 
Directors have better performance in following fiscal year. The reasoning behind this argument 
is the benefits that solid political relationships may bring to firms in costs, tax benefits and 
negotiations. In addition, under certain operating situations, BoD’s members may face different 
pressures and have different motivations to use their resources, which will influence the 
relationship between political connections and firm performance.  
 To test our hypothesis, we use a sample of Brazilian listed companies that compose the 
market index (ibovespa), and manually collected data about the members of the Board of 
Director of each company, by analyzing the Curriculum Vitae of each member. We found a 
positive relationship between politically connected members and the one-year-ahead firm 
performance. We also find that the positive influence of political relationships is stronger in 
companies that underperform the industry, which means that companies facing a financial 
distress or are underperforming vis a vis the industry are more likely to improve their 
performance in the following year if the members of their Board of Directors have strong 
political connections. Moreover, we find that executive members with political connections 
may have a stronger influence on companies that outperform the industry while members with 
no other function in the company rather than being a counselor may have a stronger influence 
on the companies that underperform the industry. 
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 Our findings may have implications on the needs of a deeper study of the complexity of 
corporate governance of Brazilian companies. Plus, our findings may have, despites its 
limitations, cross-sectional policy implications for other transition economies. First, because 
our findings show that political connections may be used as a way to improve firm performance, 
mostly in companies in a fragile financial situation. And on the other hand, these political 
relations may be associated to some conflict of interests and lead to some prejudicial decisions 
for the firms. For this reason it is crucial to reinforce the importance of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to constrain the power derived from political relationships.  
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